The size of the buffer being bounced is not checked if it happens to be larger than the size of the mapped buffer. Because the size can be controlled by a device, as it's the case with virtio devices, this can lead to memory corruption. This patch saves the remaining buffer memory for each slab and uses that information for validation in the sync/unmap paths before swiotlb_bounce is called. Validating this argument is important under the threat models of AMD SEV-SNP and Intel TDX, where the HV is considered untrusted. Signed-off-by: Martin Radev <martin.b.radev@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> |
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| .. | ||
| coherent.c | ||
| contiguous.c | ||
| debug.c | ||
| debug.h | ||
| direct.c | ||
| direct.h | ||
| dummy.c | ||
| Kconfig | ||
| Makefile | ||
| map_benchmark.c | ||
| mapping.c | ||
| ops_helpers.c | ||
| pool.c | ||
| remap.c | ||
| swiotlb.c | ||