linux-xiaomi-chiron/include
Daniel Borkmann 9facc33687 bpf: reject any prog that failed read-only lock
We currently lock any JITed image as read-only via bpf_jit_binary_lock_ro()
as well as the BPF image as read-only through bpf_prog_lock_ro(). In
the case any of these would fail we throw a WARN_ON_ONCE() in order to
yell loudly to the log. Perhaps, to some extend, this may be comparable
to an allocation where __GFP_NOWARN is explicitly not set.

Added via 65869a47f3 ("bpf: improve read-only handling"), this behavior
is slightly different compared to any of the other in-kernel set_memory_ro()
users who do not check the return code of set_memory_ro() and friends /at
all/ (e.g. in the case of module_enable_ro() / module_disable_ro()). Given
in BPF this is mandatory hardening step, we want to know whether there
are any issues that would leave both BPF data writable. So it happens
that syzkaller enabled fault injection and it triggered memory allocation
failure deep inside x86's change_page_attr_set_clr() which was triggered
from set_memory_ro().

Now, there are two options: i) leaving everything as is, and ii) reworking
the image locking code in order to have a final checkpoint out of the
central bpf_prog_select_runtime() which probes whether any of the calls
during prog setup weren't successful, and then bailing out with an error.
Option ii) is a better approach since this additional paranoia avoids
altogether leaving any potential W+X pages from BPF side in the system.
Therefore, lets be strict about it, and reject programs in such unlikely
occasion. While testing I noticed also that one bpf_prog_lock_ro()
call was missing on the outer dummy prog in case of calls, e.g. in the
destructor we call bpf_prog_free_deferred() on the main prog where we
try to bpf_prog_unlock_free() the program, and since we go via
bpf_prog_select_runtime() do that as well.

Reported-by: syzbot+3b889862e65a98317058@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+9e762b52dd17e616a7a5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-06-15 11:14:25 -07:00
..
acpi * Stratix10 SDRAM support to altera_edac (Thor Thayer) 2018-06-06 15:36:13 -07:00
asm-generic int-ll64.h: define u{8,16,32,64} and s{8,16,32,64} based on uapi header 2018-06-07 17:34:38 -07:00
clocksource ARM: SoC platform updates for 4.17 2018-04-05 21:21:08 -07:00
crypto Merge branch 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6 2018-06-05 15:51:21 -07:00
drm drm for v4.18-rc1 2018-06-06 08:16:33 -07:00
dt-bindings This time we have a good set of changes to the core framework that do some 2018-06-09 12:06:24 -07:00
keys
kvm KVM: arm/arm64: vgic: Fix source vcpu issues for GICv2 SGI 2018-04-27 12:39:09 +01:00
linux bpf: reject any prog that failed read-only lock 2018-06-15 11:14:25 -07:00
math-emu
media media: v4l2-core: push taking ioctl mutex down to ioctl handler 2018-05-28 16:31:44 -04:00
memory
misc ocxl: Expose the thread_id needed for wait on POWER9 2018-06-03 20:40:32 +10:00
net tls: fix NULL pointer dereference on poll 2018-06-11 16:29:54 -07:00
pcmcia
ras PCI/AER: Add TLP header information to tracepoint 2018-05-10 08:34:52 -05:00
rdma RDMA/restrack: Change SPDX tag to properly reflect license 2018-06-05 14:04:20 -06:00
scsi SCSI misc on 20180610 2018-06-10 13:01:12 -07:00
soc soc: bcm2835: Make !RASPBERRYPI_FIRMWARE dummies return failure 2018-04-16 15:15:23 -07:00
sound sound updates for 4.18 2018-06-06 09:08:38 -07:00
target scsi: target: transport should handle st FM/EOM/ILI reads 2018-05-18 12:22:48 -04:00
trace Merge branch 'core-rseq-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip 2018-06-10 10:17:09 -07:00
uapi Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pablo/nf 2018-06-11 14:24:32 -07:00
video media: include/video/omapfb_dss.h: use IS_ENABLED() 2018-05-05 11:45:51 -04:00
xen xen/privcmd: add IOCTL_PRIVCMD_MMAP_RESOURCE 2018-05-14 15:25:37 +02:00