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Jason A. Donenfeld 6f98a4bfee random: block in /dev/urandom
This topic has come up countless times, and usually doesn't go anywhere.
This time I thought I'd bring it up with a slightly narrower focus,
updated for some developments over the last three years: we finally can
make /dev/urandom always secure, in light of the fact that our RNG is
now always seeded.

Ever since Linus' 50ee7529ec ("random: try to actively add entropy
rather than passively wait for it"), the RNG does a haveged-style jitter
dance around the scheduler, in order to produce entropy (and credit it)
for the case when we're stuck in wait_for_random_bytes(). How ever you
feel about the Linus Jitter Dance is beside the point: it's been there
for three years and usually gets the RNG initialized in a second or so.

As a matter of fact, this is what happens currently when people use
getrandom(). It's already there and working, and most people have been
using it for years without realizing.

So, given that the kernel has grown this mechanism for seeding itself
from nothing, and that this procedure happens pretty fast, maybe there's
no point any longer in having /dev/urandom give insecure bytes. In the
past we didn't want the boot process to deadlock, which was
understandable. But now, in the worst case, a second goes by, and the
problem is resolved. It seems like maybe we're finally at a point when
we can get rid of the infamous "urandom read hole".

The one slight drawback is that the Linus Jitter Dance relies on random_
get_entropy() being implemented. The first lines of try_to_generate_
entropy() are:

	stack.now = random_get_entropy();
	if (stack.now == random_get_entropy())
		return;

On most platforms, random_get_entropy() is simply aliased to get_cycles().
The number of machines without a cycle counter or some other
implementation of random_get_entropy() in 2022, which can also run a
mainline kernel, and at the same time have a both broken and out of date
userspace that relies on /dev/urandom never blocking at boot is thought
to be exceedingly low. And to be clear: those museum pieces without
cycle counters will continue to run Linux just fine, and even
/dev/urandom will be operable just like before; the RNG just needs to be
seeded first through the usual means, which should already be the case
now.

On systems that really do want unseeded randomness, we already offer
getrandom(GRND_INSECURE), which is in use by, e.g., systemd for seeding
their hash tables at boot. Nothing in this commit would affect
GRND_INSECURE, and it remains the means of getting those types of random
numbers.

This patch goes a long way toward eliminating a long overdue userspace
crypto footgun. After several decades of endless user confusion, we will
finally be able to say, "use any single one of our random interfaces and
you'll be fine. They're all the same. It doesn't matter." And that, I
think, is really something. Finally all of those blog posts and
disagreeing forums and contradictory articles will all become correct
about whatever they happened to recommend, and along with it, a whole
class of vulnerabilities eliminated.

With very minimal downside, we're finally in a position where we can
make this change.

Cc: Dinh Nguyen <dinguyen@kernel.org>
Cc: Nick Hu <nickhu@andestech.com>
Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp>
Cc: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Joshua Kinard <kumba@gentoo.org>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Lennart Poettering <mzxreary@0pointer.de>
Cc: Konstantin Ryabitsev <konstantin@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
2022-03-12 18:00:55 -07:00
arch - Fix the ptrace regset xfpregs_set() callback to behave according to the ABI 2022-02-20 12:46:21 -08:00
block block/wbt: fix negative inflight counter when remove scsi device 2022-02-17 07:54:03 -07:00
certs certs: Fix build error when CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY is empty 2022-01-23 00:08:44 +09:00
crypto crypto: af_alg - get rid of alg_memory_allocated 2022-02-15 14:29:04 +00:00
Documentation random: remove ifdef'd out interrupt bench 2022-02-21 21:14:00 +01:00
drivers random: block in /dev/urandom 2022-03-12 18:00:55 -07:00
fs fs.mount_setattr.v5.17-rc4 2022-02-20 11:01:47 -08:00
include random: block in /dev/urandom 2022-03-12 18:00:55 -07:00
init lib/stackdepot: allow optional init and stack_table allocation by kvmalloc() 2022-01-22 08:33:37 +02:00
ipc ipc/sem: do not sleep with a spin lock held 2022-02-04 09:25:05 -08:00
kernel random: clear fast pool, crng, and batches in cpuhp bring up 2022-02-21 21:14:21 +01:00
lib random: remove unused tracepoints 2022-02-21 21:14:00 +01:00
LICENSES LICENSES/LGPL-2.1: Add LGPL-2.1-or-later as valid identifiers 2021-12-16 14:33:10 +01:00
mm mm: don't try to NUMA-migrate COW pages that have other uses 2022-02-17 08:57:47 -08:00
net ipv6: fix data-race in fib6_info_hw_flags_set / fib6_purge_rt 2022-02-17 09:48:24 -08:00
samples samples/seccomp: Adjust sample to also provide kill option 2022-02-10 19:09:12 -08:00
scripts kconfig: fix failing to generate auto.conf 2022-02-12 23:24:19 +09:00
security integrity-v5-17-fix 2022-02-07 09:55:14 -08:00
sound ASoC: intel: skylake: Set max DMA segment size 2022-02-17 09:39:44 +01:00
tools fs.mount_setattr.v5.17-rc4 2022-02-20 11:01:47 -08:00
usr kbuild: remove include/linux/cyclades.h from header file check 2022-01-27 08:51:08 +01:00
virt Two larger x86 series: 2022-01-28 19:00:26 +02:00
.clang-format genirq/msi: Make interrupt allocation less convoluted 2021-12-16 22:22:20 +01:00
.cocciconfig scripts: add Linux .cocciconfig for coccinelle 2016-07-22 12:13:39 +02:00
.get_maintainer.ignore Opt out of scripts/get_maintainer.pl 2019-05-16 10:53:40 -07:00
.gitattributes .gitattributes: use 'dts' diff driver for dts files 2019-12-04 19:44:11 -08:00
.gitignore .gitignore: ignore only top-level modules.builtin 2021-05-02 00:43:35 +09:00
.mailmap mailmap: update Christian Brauner's email address 2022-02-01 11:21:31 -08:00
COPYING COPYING: state that all contributions really are covered by this file 2020-02-10 13:32:20 -08:00
CREDITS MAINTAINERS: Removing Ohad from remoteproc/rpmsg maintenance 2021-12-08 10:09:40 -07:00
Kbuild kbuild: rename hostprogs-y/always to hostprogs/always-y 2020-02-04 01:53:07 +09:00
Kconfig kbuild: ensure full rebuild when the compiler is updated 2020-05-12 13:28:33 +09:00
MAINTAINERS Merge branch 'i2c/for-current' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/wsa/linux 2022-02-20 11:23:48 -08:00
Makefile Linux 5.17-rc5 2022-02-20 13:07:20 -08:00
README Drop all 00-INDEX files from Documentation/ 2018-09-09 15:08:58 -06:00

Linux kernel
============

There are several guides for kernel developers and users. These guides can
be rendered in a number of formats, like HTML and PDF. Please read
Documentation/admin-guide/README.rst first.

In order to build the documentation, use ``make htmldocs`` or
``make pdfdocs``.  The formatted documentation can also be read online at:

    https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/

There are various text files in the Documentation/ subdirectory,
several of them using the Restructured Text markup notation.

Please read the Documentation/process/changes.rst file, as it contains the
requirements for building and running the kernel, and information about
the problems which may result by upgrading your kernel.