Merge ACPICA material for 5.19-rc1:
- Add support for the Windows 11 _OSI string (Mario Limonciello)
- Add the CFMWS subtable to the CEDT table (Lawrence Hileman).
- iASL: NHLT: Treat Terminator as specific_config (Piotr Maziarz).
- iASL: NHLT: Fix parsing undocumented bytes at the end of Endpoint
Descriptor (Piotr Maziarz).
- iASL: NHLT: Rename linux specific strucures to device_info (Piotr
Maziarz).
- Add new ACPI 6.4 semantics to Load() and LoadTable() (Bob Moore).
- Clean up double word in comment (Tom Rix).
- Update copyright notices to the year 2022 (Bob Moore).
- Remove some tabs and // comments - automated cleanup (Bob Moore).
- Replace zero-length array with flexible-array member (Gustavo A. R.
Silva).
- Interpreter: Add units to time variable names (Paul Menzel).
- Add support for ARM Performance Monitoring Unit Table (Besar
Wicaksono).
- Inform users about ACPI spec violation related to sleep length (Paul
Menzel).
- iASL/MADT: Add OEM-defined subtable (Bob Moore).
- Interpreter: Fix some typo mistakes (Selvarasu Ganesan).
- Updates for revision E.d of IORT (Shameer Kolothum).
- Use ACPI_FORMAT_UINT64 for 64-bit output (Bob Moore).
- Update version to 20220331 (Bob Moore).
* acpica: (21 commits)
Revert "ACPICA: executer/exsystem: Warn about sleeps greater than 10 ms"
ACPICA: Update version to 20220331
ACPICA: exsystem.c: Use ACPI_FORMAT_UINT64 for 64-bit output
ACPICA: IORT: Updates for revision E.d
ACPICA: executer/exsystem: Fix some typo mistakes
ACPICA: iASL/MADT: Add OEM-defined subtable
ACPICA: executer/exsystem: Warn about sleeps greater than 10 ms
ACPICA: executer/exsystem: Inform users about ACPI spec violation
ACPICA: Add support for ARM Performance Monitoring Unit Table.
ACPICA: executer/exsystem: Add units to time variable names
ACPICA: Headers: Replace zero-length array with flexible-array member
ACPICA: Removed some tabs and // comments
ACPICA: Update copyright notices to the year 2022
ACPICA: Clean up double word in comment
ACPICA: Add new ACPI 6.4 semantics for LoadTable() operator
ACPICA: Add new ACPI 6.4 semantics to the Load() operator
ACPICA: iASL: NHLT: Rename linux specific strucures to device_info
ACPICA: iASL: NHLT: Fix parsing undocumented bytes at the end of Endpoint Descriptor
ACPICA: iASL: NHLT: Treat Terminator as specific_config
ACPICA: Add the subtable CFMWS to the CEDT table
...
This reverts commit b20eee62ee. The
example has just been removed altogether in the mailbox tree.
Reported-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Currently, CONFIG_MODVERSIONS needs extra link to embed the symbol
versions into ELF objects. Then, modpost extracts the version CRCs
from them.
The following figures show how it currently works, and how I am trying
to change it.
Current implementation
======================
|----------|
embed CRC -------------------------->| final |
$(CC) $(LD) / |---------| | link for |
-----> *.o -------> *.o -->| modpost | | vmlinux |
/ / | |-- *.mod.c -->| or |
/ genksyms / |---------| | module |
*.c ------> *.symversions |----------|
Genksyms outputs the calculated CRCs in the form of linker script
(*.symversions), which is used by $(LD) to update the object.
If CONFIG_LTO_CLANG=y, the build process is much more complex. Embedding
the CRCs is postponed until the LLVM bitcode is converted into ELF,
creating another intermediate *.prelink.o.
However, this complexity is unneeded. There is no reason why we must
embed version CRCs in objects so early.
There is final link stage for vmlinux (scripts/link-vmlinux.sh) and
modules (scripts/Makefile.modfinal). We can link CRCs at the very last
moment.
New implementation
==================
|----------|
--------------------------------------->| final |
$(CC) / |---------| | link for |
-----> *.o ---->| | | vmlinux |
/ | modpost |--- .vmlinux.export.c -->| or |
/ genksyms | |--- *.mod.c ------------>| module |
*.c ------> *.cmd -->|---------| |----------|
Pass the symbol versions to modpost as separate text data, which are
available in *.cmd files.
This commit changes modpost to extract CRCs from *.cmd files instead of
from ELF objects.
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Nicolas Schier <nicolas@fjasle.eu>
Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Tested-by: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com> # LLVM-14 (x86-64)
find_symbol() returns the first symbol found in the hash table. This
table is global, so it may return a symbol from an unexpected module.
There is a case where we want to search for a symbol with a given name
in a specified module.
Add sym_find_with_module(), which receives the module pointer as the
second argument. It is equivalent to find_module() if NULL is passed
as the module pointer.
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Nicolas Schier <nicolas@fjasle.eu>
Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com> # LLVM-14 (x86-64)
Create a maintainer entry for CAAM trusted keys in the Linux keyring.
Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>
Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Update documentation for trusted key use with the Cryptographic
Acceleration and Assurance Module (CAAM), an IP on NXP SoCs.
Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
The Cryptographic Acceleration and Assurance Module (CAAM) is an IP core
built into many newer i.MX and QorIQ SoCs by NXP.
The CAAM does crypto acceleration, hardware number generation and
has a blob mechanism for encapsulation/decapsulation of sensitive material.
This blob mechanism depends on a device specific random 256-bit One Time
Programmable Master Key that is fused in each SoC at manufacturing
time. This key is unreadable and can only be used by the CAAM for AES
encryption/decryption of user data.
This makes it a suitable backend (source) for kernel trusted keys.
Previous commits generalized trusted keys to support multiple backends
and added an API to access the CAAM blob mechanism. Based on these,
provide the necessary glue to use the CAAM for trusted keys.
Reviewed-by: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at>
Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Tim Harvey <tharvey@gateworks.com>
Tested-by: Matthias Schiffer <matthias.schiffer@ew.tq-group.com>
Tested-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>
Tested-by: Michael Walle <michael@walle.cc> # on ls1028a (non-E and E)
Tested-by: John Ernberg <john.ernberg@actia.se> # iMX8QXP
Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
The NXP Cryptographic Acceleration and Assurance Module (CAAM)
can be used to protect user-defined data across system reboot:
- When the system is fused and boots into secure state, the master
key is a unique never-disclosed device-specific key
- random key is encrypted by key derived from master key
- data is encrypted using the random key
- encrypted data and its encrypted random key are stored alongside
- This blob can now be safely stored in non-volatile memory
On next power-on:
- blob is loaded into CAAM
- CAAM writes decrypted data either into memory or key register
Add functions to realize encrypting and decrypting into memory alongside
the CAAM driver.
They will be used in a later commit as a source for the trusted key
seal/unseal mechanism.
Reviewed-by: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at>
Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>
Tested-by: Tim Harvey <tharvey@gateworks.com>
Tested-by: Matthias Schiffer <matthias.schiffer@ew.tq-group.com>
Tested-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>
Tested-by: Michael Walle <michael@walle.cc> # on ls1028a (non-E and E)
Tested-by: John Ernberg <john.ernberg@actia.se> # iMX8QXP
Signed-off-by: Steffen Trumtrar <s.trumtrar@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Depending on SoC variant, a CAAM may be available, but with some futures
fused out. The LS1028A (non-E) SoC is one such SoC and while it
indicates BLOB support, BLOB operations will ultimately fail, because
there is no AES support. Add a new blob_present member to reflect
whether both BLOB support and the AES support it depends on is
available.
These will be used in a follow-up commit to allow blob driver
initialization to error out on SoCs without the necessary hardware
support instead of failing at runtime with a cryptic
caam_jr 8020000.jr: 20000b0f: CCB: desc idx 11: : Invalid CHA selected.
Co-developed-by: Michael Walle <michael@walle.cc>
Signed-off-by: Michael Walle <michael@walle.cc>
Tested-by: Michael Walle <michael@walle.cc> # on ls1028a (non-E and E)
Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
The two existing trusted key sources don't make use of the kernel RNG,
but instead let the hardware doing the sealing/unsealing also
generate the random key material. However, both users and future
backends may want to place less trust into the quality of the trust
source's random number generator and instead reuse the kernel entropy
pool, which can be seeded from multiple entropy sources.
Make this possible by adding a new trusted.rng parameter,
that will force use of the kernel RNG. In its absence, it's up
to the trust source to decide, which random numbers to use,
maintaining the existing behavior.
Suggested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at>
Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>
Tested-by: Michael Walle <michael@walle.cc> # on ls1028a (non-E and E)
Tested-by: John Ernberg <john.ernberg@actia.se> # iMX8QXP
Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
With recent rework, trusted keys are no longer limited to TPM as trust
source. The Kconfig symbol is unchanged however leading to a few issues:
- TCG_TPM is required, even if only TEE is to be used
- Enabling TCG_TPM, but excluding it from available trusted sources
is not possible
- TEE=m && TRUSTED_KEYS=y will lead to TEE support being silently
dropped, which is not the best user experience
Remedy these issues by introducing two new boolean Kconfig symbols:
TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM and TRUSTED_KEYS_TEE with the appropriate
dependencies.
Any new code depending on the TPM trusted key backend in particular
or symbols exported by it will now need to explicitly state that it
depends on TRUSTED_KEYS && TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM
The latter to ensure the dependency is built and the former to ensure
it's reachable for module builds. There are no such users yet.
Reviewed-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>
Tested-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>
Tested-by: Andreas Rammhold <andreas@rammhold.de>
Tested-by: Tim Harvey <tharvey@gateworks.com>
Tested-by: Michael Walle <michael@walle.cc> # on ls1028a (non-E and E)
Tested-by: John Ernberg <john.ernberg@actia.se> # iMX8QXP
Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
TPM2_GetCapability with a capability that has the property type value
of TPM_PT_TOTAL_COMMANDS returns a zero length list, when an Infineon
TPM2 is in field upgrade mode.
Since an Infineon TPM2.0 in field upgrade mode returns RC_SUCCESS on
TPM2_Startup, the field upgrade mode has to be detected by
TPM2_GetCapability.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Mahnke-Hartmann <stefan.mahnke-hartmann@infineon.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Under certain conditions uninitialized memory will be accessed.
As described by TCG Trusted Platform Module Library Specification,
rev. 1.59 (Part 3: Commands), if a TPM2_GetCapability is received,
requesting a capability, the TPM in field upgrade mode may return a
zero length list.
Check the property count in tpm2_get_tpm_pt().
Fixes: 2ab3241161 ("tpm: migrate tpm2_get_tpm_pt() to use struct tpm_buf")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stefan Mahnke-Hartmann <stefan.mahnke-hartmann@infineon.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Returning an error value in an i2c remove callback results in an error
message being emitted by the i2c core, but otherwise it doesn't make a
difference. The device goes away anyhow and the devm cleanups are
called.
As tpm_cr50_i2c_remove() emits an error message already and the
additional error message by the i2c core doesn't add any useful
information, change the return value to zero to suppress this error
message.
Note that if i2c_clientdata is NULL, there is something really fishy.
Assuming no memory corruption happened (then all bets are lost anyhow),
tpm_cr50_i2c_remove() is only called after tpm_cr50_i2c_probe() returned
successfully. So there was a tpm chip registered before and after
tpm_cr50_i2c_remove() its privdata is freed but the associated character
device isn't removed. If after that happened userspace accesses the
character device it's likely that the freed memory is accessed. For that
reason the warning message is made a bit more frightening.
Signed-off-by: Uwe Kleine-König <u.kleine-koenig@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Accept one additional numerical value of DID:VID for next generation
Google TPM with new firmware, to be used in future Chromebooks.
The TPM with the new firmware has the code name TI50, and is going to
use the same interfaces.
Signed-off-by: Jes B. Klinke <jbk@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Only tpm_tis and tpm_tis_synquacer have a dedicated way to access
multiple bytes at once, every other driver will just fall back to
read_bytes/write_bytes. Therefore, remove the read16/read32/write32
calls and move their logic to read_bytes/write_bytes.
Suggested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Holland <johannes.holland@infineon.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Currently it returns zero when CRQ response timed out, it should return
an error code instead.
Fixes: d8d74ea3c0 ("tpm: ibmvtpm: Wait for buffer to be set before proceeding")
Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Return boolean values ("true" or "false") instead of 1 or 0 from bool
functions.
Signed-off-by: Haowen Bai <baihaowen@meizu.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
The blacklist_init() function calls panic() for memory allocation
errors. This change documents the reason why we don't return -ENODEV.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220322111323.542184-2-mic@digikod.net
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/YjeW2r6Wv55Du0bJ@iki.fi
Suggested-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Add a kernel option SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_AUTH_UPDATE to enable the root user
to dynamically add new keys to the blacklist keyring. This enables to
invalidate new certificates, either from being loaded in a keyring, or
from being trusted in a PKCS#7 certificate chain. This also enables to
add new file hashes to be denied by the integrity infrastructure.
Being able to untrust a certificate which could have normaly been
trusted is a sensitive operation. This is why adding new hashes to the
blacklist keyring is only allowed when these hashes are signed and
vouched by the builtin trusted keyring. A blacklist hash is stored as a
key description. The PKCS#7 signature of this description must be
provided as the key payload.
Marking a certificate as untrusted should be enforced while the system
is running. It is then forbiden to remove such blacklist keys.
Update blacklist keyring, blacklist key and revoked certificate access
rights:
* allows the root user to search for a specific blacklisted hash, which
make sense because the descriptions are already viewable;
* forbids key update (blacklist and asymmetric ones);
* restricts kernel rights on the blacklist keyring to align with the
root user rights.
See help in tools/certs/print-cert-tbs-hash.sh .
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210712170313.884724-6-mic@digikod.net
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Add and use a check-blacklist-hashes.awk script to make sure that the
builtin blacklist hashes set with CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST will
effectively be taken into account as blacklisted hashes. This is useful
to debug invalid hash formats, and it make sure that previous hashes
which could have been loaded in the kernel, but silently ignored, are
now noticed and deal with by the user at kernel build time.
This also prevent stricter blacklist key description checking (provided
by following commits) to failed for builtin hashes.
Update CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST help to explain the content of
a hash string and how to generate certificate ones.
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210712170313.884724-3-mic@digikod.net
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Before exposing this new key type to user space, make sure that only
meaningful blacklisted hashes are accepted. This is also checked for
builtin blacklisted hashes, but a following commit make sure that the
user will notice (at built time) and will fix the configuration if it
already included errors.
Check that a blacklist key description starts with a valid prefix and
then a valid hexadecimal string.
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210712170313.884724-4-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Factor out the blacklist hash creation with the get_raw_hash() helper.
This also centralize the "tbs" and "bin" prefixes and make them private,
which help to manage them consistently.
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210712170313.884724-5-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Add a new helper print-cert-tbs-hash.sh to generate a TBSCertificate
hash from a given certificate. This is useful to generate a blacklist
key description used to forbid loading a specific certificate in a
keyring, or to invalidate a certificate provided by a PKCS#7 file.
This kind of hash formatting is required to populate the file pointed
out by CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST, but only the kernel code was
available to understand how to effectively create such hash.
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210712170313.884724-2-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
This instance is the only opencoded version of the macro, so have it
follow suit.
Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
A 's/pf/of/' on rpmsg-name description.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd <swboyd@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Guenter Roeck <groeck@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee.jones@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220512013921.164637-2-swboyd@chromium.org
KASAN report null-ptr-deref as follows:
BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in nfsd_fill_super+0xc6/0xe0 [nfsd]
Write of size 8 at addr 000000000000005d by task a.out/852
CPU: 7 PID: 852 Comm: a.out Not tainted 5.18.0-rc7-dirty #66
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.14.0-1.fc33 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x34/0x44
kasan_report+0xab/0x120
? nfsd_mkdir+0x71/0x1c0 [nfsd]
? nfsd_fill_super+0xc6/0xe0 [nfsd]
nfsd_fill_super+0xc6/0xe0 [nfsd]
? nfsd_mkdir+0x1c0/0x1c0 [nfsd]
get_tree_keyed+0x8e/0x100
vfs_get_tree+0x41/0xf0
__do_sys_fsconfig+0x590/0x670
? fscontext_read+0x180/0x180
? anon_inode_getfd+0x4f/0x70
do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
This can be reproduce by concurrent operations:
1. fsopen(nfsd)/fsconfig
2. insmod/rmmod nfsd
Since the nfsd file system is registered before than nfsd_net allocated,
the caller may get the file_system_type and use the nfsd_net before it
allocated, then null-ptr-deref occurred.
So init_nfsd() should call register_filesystem() last.
Fixes: bd5ae9288d ("nfsd: register pernet ops last, unregister first")
Signed-off-by: Zhang Xiaoxu <zhangxiaoxu5@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
If laundry_wq create failed, the cld notifier should be unregistered.
Signed-off-by: Zhang Xiaoxu <zhangxiaoxu5@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
I noticed CPU pipeline stalls while using perf.
Once an svc thread is scheduled and executing an RPC, no other
processes will touch svc_rqst::rq_flags. Thus bus-locked atomics are
not needed outside the svc thread scheduler.
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Clean up nfsd4_open() by converting a large comment at the only
call site for nfsd4_process_open2() to a kerneldoc comment in
front of that function.
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Clean up: Pull case arms back one tab stop to conform every other
switch statement in fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c.
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
There have been reports of races that cause NFSv4 OPEN(CREATE) to
return an error even though the requested file was created. NFSv4
does not provide a status code for this case.
To mitigate some of these problems, reorganize the NFSv4
OPEN(CREATE) logic to allocate resources before the file is actually
created, and open the new file while the parent directory is still
locked.
Two new APIs are added:
+ Add an API that works like nfsd_file_acquire() but does not open
the underlying file. The OPEN(CREATE) path can use this API when it
already has an open file.
+ Add an API that is kin to dentry_open(). NFSD needs to create a
file and grab an open "struct file *" atomically. The
alloc_empty_file() has to be done before the inode create. If it
fails (for example, because the NFS server has exceeded its
max_files limit), we avoid creating the file and can still return
an error to the NFS client.
BugLink: https://bugzilla.linux-nfs.org/show_bug.cgi?id=382
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Tested-by: JianHong Yin <jiyin@redhat.com>
The Wolfson Microelectronics Arizona audio can be connected via SPI bus
(e.g. WM5110 on Exynos5433 TM2 board), so allow SPI peripheral
properties.
Reported-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Charles Keepax <ckeepax@opensource.cirrus.com>
Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee.jones@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220504084304.46173-1-krzysztof.kozlowski@linaro.org
Returning an error value in an i2c remove callback results in a generic
error message being emitted by the i2c core, but otherwise it doesn't make
a difference. The device goes away anyhow and the devm cleanups are
called.
So instead of triggering the generic i2c error message, emit a more helpful
message if a problem occurs and return 0 to suppress the generic message.
This patch is a preparation for making i2c remove callbacks return void.
Signed-off-by: Uwe Kleine-König <u.kleine-koenig@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee.jones@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220502191012.53259-1-u.kleine-koenig@pengutronix.de
This is quite a big update, partly due to the addition of some larger
drivers (more of which is to follow since at least the AVS driver is
still a work in progress) and partly due to Charles' work sorting out
our handling of endianness. As has been the case recently it's much
more about drivers than the core.
- Overhaul of endianness specification for data formats, avoiding
needless restrictions due to CODECs.
- Initial stages of Intel AVS driver merge.
- Introduction of v4 IPC mechanism for SOF.
- TDM mode support for AK4613.
- Support for Analog Devices ADAU1361, Cirrus Logic CS35L45, Maxim
MAX98396, MediaTek MT8186, NXP i.MX8 micfil and SAI interfaces,
nVidia Tegra186 ASRC, and Texas Instruments TAS2764 and TAS2780
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Merge tag 'asoc-v5.19' of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/broonie/sound into for-linus
ASoC: Updates for v5.19
This is quite a big update, partly due to the addition of some larger
drivers (more of which is to follow since at least the AVS driver is
still a work in progress) and partly due to Charles' work sorting out
our handling of endianness. As has been the case recently it's much
more about drivers than the core.
- Overhaul of endianness specification for data formats, avoiding
needless restrictions due to CODECs.
- Initial stages of Intel AVS driver merge.
- Introduction of v4 IPC mechanism for SOF.
- TDM mode support for AK4613.
- Support for Analog Devices ADAU1361, Cirrus Logic CS35L45, Maxim
MAX98396, MediaTek MT8186, NXP i.MX8 micfil and SAI interfaces,
nVidia Tegra186 ASRC, and Texas Instruments TAS2764 and TAS2780
There are multiple xDR and xFR registers, the index is
from 0 to 7. FSL_SAI_xDR and FSL_SAI_xFR is abandoned,
replace them with FSL_SAI_xDR0 and FSL_SAI_xFR0.
Fixes: 4f7a0728b5 ("ASoC: fsl_sai: Add support for SAI new version")
Signed-off-by: Shengjiu Wang <shengjiu.wang@nxp.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1653284661-18964-1-git-send-email-shengjiu.wang@nxp.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
A obvious editing mistake caught with a cppcheck warning
sound/soc/soc-pcm.c:2132:8: style: Variable 'ret' is reassigned a
value before the old one has been used. [redundantAssignment]
ret = soc_pcm_trigger(be_substream, cmd);
^
sound/soc/soc-pcm.c:2126:9: note: ret is assigned
ret = soc_pcm_trigger(be_substream,
^
sound/soc/soc-pcm.c:2129:9: note: ret is assigned
ret = soc_pcm_trigger(be_substream,
^
Fixes: 374b50e234 ('ASoC: soc-pcm: improve BE transition for TRIGGER_START')
Signed-off-by: Pierre-Louis Bossart <pierre-louis.bossart@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Bard Liao <yung-chuan.liao@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Péter Ujfalusi <peter.ujfalusi@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220520210615.607229-1-pierre-louis.bossart@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
It will cause null-ptr-deref when using 'res', if platform_get_resource()
returns NULL, so move using 'res' after devm_ioremap_resource() that
will check it to avoid null-ptr-deref.
And use devm_platform_get_and_ioremap_resource() to simplify code.
Fixes: b5e29aa880 ("mfd: davinci_voicecodec: Remove pointless #include")
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee.jones@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220426030857.3539336-1-yangyingliang@huawei.com
The original x86 sev_alloc() only called set_memory_decrypted() on
memory returned by alloc_pages_node(), so the page order calculation
fell out of that logic. However, the common dma-direct code has several
potential allocators, not all of which are guaranteed to round up the
underlying allocation to a power-of-two size, so carrying over that
calculation for the encryption/decryption size was a mistake. Fix it by
rounding to a *number* of pages, rather than an order.
Until recently there was an even worse interaction with DMA_DIRECT_REMAP
where we could have ended up decrypting part of the next adjacent
vmalloc area, only averted by no architecture actually supporting both
configs at once. Don't ask how I found that one out...
Fixes: c10f07aa27 ("dma/direct: Handle force decryption for DMA coherent buffers in common code")
Signed-off-by: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Add an option to indicate that guest code can be found in the hypervisor
process.
Signed-off-by: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Leo Yan <leo.yan@linaro.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220517131011.6117-6-adrian.hunter@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Add an option to indicate that guest code can be found in the hypervisor
process.
Signed-off-by: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Leo Yan <leo.yan@linaro.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220517131011.6117-5-adrian.hunter@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
A common case for KVM test programs is that the test program acts as the
hypervisor, creating, running and destroying the virtual machine, and
providing the guest object code from its own object code. In this case,
the VM is not running an OS, but only the functions loaded into it by the
hypervisor test program, and conveniently, loaded at the same virtual
addresses.
Normally to resolve addresses, MMAP events are needed to map addresses
back to the object code and debug symbols for that object code.
Currently, there is no way to get such mapping information from guests
but, in the scenario described above, the guest has the same mappings
as the hypervisor, so support for that scenario can be achieved.
To support that, copy the host thread's maps to the guest thread's maps.
Note, we do not discover the guest until we encounter a guest event,
which works well because it is not until then that we know that the host
thread's maps have been set up.
Typically the main function for the guest object code is called
"guest_code", hence the name chosen for this feature. Note, that is just a
convention, the function could be named anything, and the tools do not
care.
This is primarily aimed at supporting Intel PT, or similar, where trace
data can be recorded for a guest. Refer to the final patch in this series
"perf intel-pt: Add guest_code support" for an example.
Signed-off-by: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Leo Yan <leo.yan@linaro.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220517131011.6117-4-adrian.hunter@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Factor out thread__set_guest_comm() so it can be reused.
Signed-off-by: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Leo Yan <leo.yan@linaro.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220517131011.6117-3-adrian.hunter@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
When dealing with guest machines, it can be necessary to get a reference
to the host machine. Add a machines pointer to struct machine to make that
possible.
Signed-off-by: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Leo Yan <leo.yan@linaro.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220517131011.6117-2-adrian.hunter@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Categorise and add missing PMU events for Cortex-A57/A72, based on:
https://github.com/ARM-software/data/blob/master/pmu/cortex-a57.jsonhttps://github.com/ARM-software/data/blob/master/pmu/cortex-a72.json
These contain the same events, and are based on the Arm Technical
Reference Manuals for Cortex-A57 and Cortex-A72.
Reviewed-by: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Nick Forrington <nick.forrington@arm.com>
Acked-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andrew Kilroy <andrew.kilroy@arm.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: James Clark <james.clark@arm.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Kajol Jain <kjain@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Leo Yan <leo.yan@linaro.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Mathieu Poirier <mathieu.poirier@linaro.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220517135805.313184-2-nick.forrington@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
