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Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf

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Alexei Starovoitov says:

====================
pull-request: bpf 2019-01-02

The following pull-request contains BPF updates for your *net* tree.

The main changes are:

1) prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic, from Daniel.

2) typo fix, from Xiaozhou.
====================

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This commit is contained in:
David S. Miller 2019-01-02 16:38:59 -08:00
commit be63004336
6 changed files with 1433 additions and 89 deletions
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12
include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
View file

@ -148,6 +148,7 @@ struct bpf_verifier_state {
/* call stack tracking */
struct bpf_func_state *frame[MAX_CALL_FRAMES];
u32 curframe;
bool speculative;
};
#define bpf_get_spilled_reg(slot, frame) \
@ -167,15 +168,24 @@ struct bpf_verifier_state_list {
struct bpf_verifier_state_list *next;
};
/* Possible states for alu_state member. */
#define BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_SRC 1U
#define BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_DST 2U
#define BPF_ALU_NEG_VALUE (1U << 2)
#define BPF_ALU_SANITIZE (BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_SRC | \
BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_DST)
struct bpf_insn_aux_data {
union {
enum bpf_reg_type ptr_type; /* pointer type for load/store insns */
unsigned long map_state; /* pointer/poison value for maps */
s32 call_imm; /* saved imm field of call insn */
u32 alu_limit; /* limit for add/sub register with pointer */
};
int ctx_field_size; /* the ctx field size for load insn, maybe 0 */
int sanitize_stack_off; /* stack slot to be cleared */
bool seen; /* this insn was processed by the verifier */
u8 alu_state; /* used in combination with alu_limit */
};
#define MAX_USED_MAPS 64 /* max number of maps accessed by one eBPF program */
@ -212,6 +222,8 @@ struct bpf_subprog_info {
* one verifier_env per bpf_check() call
*/
struct bpf_verifier_env {
u32 insn_idx;
u32 prev_insn_idx;
struct bpf_prog *prog; /* eBPF program being verified */
const struct bpf_verifier_ops *ops;
struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *head; /* stack of verifier states to be processed */

10
include/linux/filter.h
View file

@ -53,14 +53,10 @@ struct sock_reuseport;
#define BPF_REG_D BPF_REG_8 /* data, callee-saved */
#define BPF_REG_H BPF_REG_9 /* hlen, callee-saved */
/* Kernel hidden auxiliary/helper register for hardening step.
* Only used by eBPF JITs. It's nothing more than a temporary
* register that JITs use internally, only that here it's part
* of eBPF instructions that have been rewritten for blinding
* constants. See JIT pre-step in bpf_jit_blind_constants().
*/
/* Kernel hidden auxiliary/helper register. */
#define BPF_REG_AX MAX_BPF_REG
#define MAX_BPF_JIT_REG (MAX_BPF_REG + 1)
#define MAX_BPF_EXT_REG (MAX_BPF_REG + 1)
#define MAX_BPF_JIT_REG MAX_BPF_EXT_REG
/* unused opcode to mark special call to bpf_tail_call() helper */
#define BPF_TAIL_CALL 0xf0